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Linga in the Vaise~ika and the Mimamsa 
Toshihide ADACHI 
[lJ In the 1920's Hakuju Vi and Herman lacobiO had al-
ready pointed out that the Vaise~ika-sutra (VS) is critical of the 
Mimamsa school in regard to the following three points: 1) the 
meanings of dharma in the opening sutras,2) 2) the matter of 
the eternity of sabda (sound, word), 3) the apauru~eya-tva (not 
being compiled by a man) of the Veda. 3) In order to more clear-
ly understand the fundamental difference between these two 
schools, we must analyze not only the three above-mentioned 
points, but also the difference of the meanings of linga in their 
sutras, because unlike the just menioned three points, the 
word linga is found throughout the Mimtirhsti-sutra (MS) and 
the VS as an original concept in both of them.4) 
To research the concepts of linga in these two schools 
reveals their essential difference. The Mimamsa school regards 
the Veda as the one and only source of dharma (cf. MS 1.1.3-4) 
whereas the Vaise~ika school holds that direct perception through 
experience is the most reliable means of cognition. The purpose 
of this paper is to make it clear that their respective concepts 
of linga reflect these essential positions of these two schools. 
[2J First of all, in the MS the word linga mostly indicates 
a passage of the V eda. 5) Sabara usually refers to a passage of 
the Veda as linga when commenting on a sutra in which the 
word linga occurs. Particularly the word linga used in such 
fixed phrases as ' linga-darsantic ca' or ' lingtic ca'6) denote a 
passage of the Veda without exception. 
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Let me give MS 1.1.23 as an example. This is the last 
siitra in the section con cering the sabda·nitya·tva. 
lingadarsaniic ca. (MS 1.1. 23) 
"And because we find a linga [in the V eda]." 
lingarh caiva bhavati, viicii virupa nityayeti / anyaparam hidam 
viikyam viico nityatiim anuvadati / tasmiin nityal; sabdal; / 
(Sabara's Bhii~ya ad MS 1.1.23) 
"And also a linga exists [besides the preceding reasonsJ. 
Viicii virupa nityayii' (0 Viriipa, by the eternal word) (IJg·veda 
8.75.6, Taittiriya·sarhhitii 2.6.11.2, etc.) -Though the topic 
[of this passageJ is different [from the eternity of wordJ, this 
passage actually explains the eternity of a word. Therefore 
a word is eternal." 
As is shown in this example, these two fixed phrases are 
used as a reason.phrase (and mostly as the last of more than 
two reason-phrases). In this way, the MS presents a passage 
of the Veda as a reason for a proposition, and calls such a Vedic 
passage linga. In addition to the MS, about half of the lingas in 
the Brahma-sutra are also used in this way.8) 
[3J We notice, however, that the way lingas are used in 
the MS can also be found in VS 2.2.37, 4.2.9 and (5.2.11).9) For 
example, VS 4.2.9 reads: santy ayonijii vedalingiic ceti "Also [we 
can know thatJ there exist non· viviparous beings because of a 
linga in the Veda." Candrananda presents a following passage 
as the Veda·linga: candramii manaso jiital; "the moon was born 
from manas"(IJg·veda 10.90.13, Atharva-veda 19.6.7, etc.). The usage 
of linga in this siitra is not different from the usage in the MS. 
We must, however, pay attention to the respective reasons 
why the Veda can be linga for these two schools. In the 
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Mimamsa school, since sabda is eternal (cf. MS 1.1.6-23) and the 
Veda is considered to be not of human origin (cf. MS 1.1.27-32), 
the Veda is authoritative. 
On the other hand, the Vaise~ika school regards the Veda 
as follows: "the arrangement of the sentences in the Veda is 
based on buddhi (buddhipurvti vtikyakrtir vede)" (VS 6.1.1), and 
the buddhi is not ours, but r~i's (cf. VS 6.1.2).10) Thus, for the 
Vaise~ikas the authority of the Veda does not come from its 
eternity and non-human-origin, but from the buddhi (cognitive 
activity) of r#s. 
That is to say, the most reliable means of cognition is the 
Veda itself for the Mimamsa, but buddhi for the Vaise~ika. 
[4J The difference in the two standpoints is seen more 
directly in the form of controversy in the VS, where linga means 
a 'mark' as a proof of inference. This usage of linga is standard 
in the VS, and all the examples,ll) except VS 2.2.37 and 4.2.9 
mentioned above, can be understood in this meaning. 
In the VS, this kind of linga is divided into two: 1) dr~tam 
lingam and 2) adr~ta-lingam. Prsastapada's twofold division of 
anumtina into 1) dr~tam and 2) stimtinyato-dr~tam (PDh (N): 205, 
PDh (K): 203) seems to be based on this division.]2) Of these 
two kinds of linga, the typical example of dr~tam lingam is the 
lingas of a cow, i. e., 'horns' etc. (VS 2.1.8), and the represen-
tatives of adr~ta-lingam are lingas of the six unseen substances. 
When such unseen substances as vtiyu (wind) are explained in 
the VS, their lingas are always given at the head of their 
paragraph. Among these adr~ta-lingas, the VS discussed in par-
ticular those of vtiyu and titman (2.1.15-19 & 3.2.6-14), because 
vtiyu is the first of these unseen substances in the order of the 
nine substances, and because the existence of titman is one of 
the main subjects in Indian philosophy. 
The linga of vtiyu is sparsa (touch) (VS 2.1.9-10). This 
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liizga is analyzed by an opponent as follows: 
vttyuy iti sati sannikar'ie pratyak'ittbhttvttd dntam liizgam na 
vidyate (VS 2.1.15) 
"[In the case of cow, there exists the direct perception such 
as 'this is a cow' when a visual organ touches a cow, but] 
there does not exist the direct perception that [this is] vttyu 
[even] when [skin] touches [vttyu]. Therefore [in the case 
of vttyu] a visible liizga (dr'itam liizgam)13) [such as 'horns' in 
the case of a cow] does not exist." 
sttmttnyato dr~tttc cttvise~af:z (VS 2.1.16) 
"Moreover, [even if you try to infer the basis of 'touch'] by 
means of [the inference named] 'seen in common' (sttmttnya-
to dr~ta), [we can know] no distinction [of vttyu from 'ether' 
etc. as the basis of 'touch', because 'ether' etc. are also im-
perceptible in the same way as vttyu is]. [Therefore, we 
cannot infer vttyu through 'touch'.]" 
tasmttd ttgamikam (VS 2.1.17) 
"Consequently [the statement "(This is) vttyu" is] grounded 
on sacred Scriptures." 
In 2.1.15 the opponent first states the non-existence of 
dntam liizgam and in 2.1.16 he then insists that the existence 
of vttyu can not be established even by sttmttnyoto dr~ta which 
is a means to know the existence of the basis of adr'ita-liizga. 
After having shown in these two sfitras that the liizga-theory 
of the Vaise~ika is not efficient in proving the existence of the 
basis of the liizga, he finally concludes in 2.1.17 that the know-
ledge of vttyu is nothing but ttgamika, i. e., being grounded on 
sacred Scriptures (= the Veda).W This objection is not a denial 
of the existence of vttyu, but it concerns a method of cognition. 15) 
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It is supposed by some scholars16) that the opponent here 
is a Mimamsaka because of the opponent's conclusive assertion. 
This supposition is well supported by my analysis above of the 
linga in the MS, where the Veda is linga. Therefore, we can 
regard the objection in 2.1.15-17 as the Mimamsa's criticism17) 
of the Vaise:;;ika's linga-theory, in which things and phenomena 
like sparsa are acknowledged as linga. 
[5J To this objection, the Vaise:;;ika school answers as 
follows: 
samjiiiikarma tv asmadvisi~tiiniim lingam (VS 2.1.18) 
"[Your assertion isJ not [rightJ. The deed of naming [viiyu 
'viiyu'J [which is doneJ by more excellent people than we, 
[suchJ is the linga [of viiyu]." 
pratyak~apurvakatviit samjiiiikarmm,za/:z (VS 2.1.19) 
"Because the deed of naming is dependent on direct percep-
tion." 
Candrananda regards these two sutras as establishing the parise/fa 
(elimination) which assists and accomplishes the siimiinyato dr/fta 
in 2.1.16. It is necessary for the establishmemt of parise/fa to 
limit objects to a fixed number. The Vaise:;;ika acknowledges 
only nine substances. Candrananda interprets these two sutras 
as a proof of non-existence of a tenth substance, commenting 
on linga in 2.1.18 as 'naviiniim eva dravyiiniirh bhave lingam' (the 
linga which shows that only nine substances exist). As Nozawa 
points out (1989: 169-170, 172-175, 1991: 29-30, 32-34), this inter-
pretation agrees with Dignaga's for the most part (cf. PSV (K): 
109b6-111a5, (V): 28b3-29b8, Kitagawa 1965: 79ff, Hayes 1980: 249 
-252)_ 
But in my opinion this is not the original intention of the 
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siitras. First, it is hardly possible to read limitations on the 
number of substances in the statement of VS 2.1.18 itself. Second-
ly, we cannot find parise~a-inference in VS 3.2.6-8 paralleling 
2.1.15-17. Thirdly, avise~a in 2.1.16 surely make sense without 
assuming a tenth substance. Lastly, in spite of Dignaga's interpre-
tation (PSV (K): 1l0a2-3, (V): 28b6-7), VS 2.1.10 is not considered 
to be a part of parise~a-inference. Therefore, it can hardly be 
understood that VS 2.1.18-19 refers to limitations on the number 
of substances. 18) 
If Candrananda's interpretation is denied in this way, how 
should we understand these two siitras? 
It is true that these siitras seem not to be an answer to the 
objection. In fact, they do not directly refer to the relationship 
between 'touch' Clinga) and 'wind' (lingin) , which is the main 
point of the objection. But this answer makes sense when we 
take the objection quoted above to be a denial of inference. 
The objection in VS 2.1.15-17 was that inference is not 
valid to prove the existence of invisible objects like vayu19) and 
that their existence can be known on the ground of the Veda. 
The answer to this objection ought to be the establishment of 
the possibility of inference. Indeed, these two siitras seem to 
state the possibility of inference. Their intention will be as 
follows; So long as the name (vayu) exists, someone must have 
done the deed of naming (vayu 'vayu'). So long as someone 
named it, he must have directly perceived it, because it is im-
possible to name something without perceiving it directly, just 
as in the case of the deed of naming a new-born child (nama-
kara1Ja) (cf. C's Vrtti ad 2.1.19). That is to say, as long as 
direct perception is acknowledged as valid and the name of an 
object exists, it is possible to infer the existence of the unseen 
object through the linga which is sarhjiia-karman. 20 ) In this way, 
VS 2.1.18-19 serves as an answer to the objection. 
To sum up the argument examined above, the passage VS 
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2.1.15-19 reveals the fundamental difference in the basic means 
of cognition between the Mimamsakas and the Vaise~ikas; the 
Veda for the former, pratyak~a for the latter. At the same time, 
VS 2.1.18-19 shows that inference of an invisible object holds 
good if the direct perception of it (which is, of course, not an 
ordinary person's, but that of a r~i) has been realized. 
[6J The lingas of atman (soul) are prii1;ta (exhalation) and 
apana (inhalation) etc. (VS 3.2.4)20. These lingas are criticized 
by an opponent in VS 3.2.6-8, which is exactly the same as the 
opponent's statement on the linga of vayu (2.1.15-17) except the 
first word. 
yajiiadafta iti sati sannikar~e Pratyak~abhiivad dr~tam lingam nll. 
vidyate (VS 3.2.6"=;:2.1.15) 
"There does not exist a direct perception such as '[this ii> 
atman calledJ Yajfiadatta,' [evenJ when [a visual organJ 
touches [Yajfiadatta who is exhaling and so onJ. Therefore, 
[in the case of atmanJ a visible linga (dr~tam lingam) does 
not exist." 
samanyato dr~tac cavise~al;t (VS 3.2.7=2.1.16) 
tasmad agamikam (VS 3.2.8=2.1.17) 
The opponent's criticism is that the lingas of atman cannot prove 
the existence of atman because of the uncertainty of the con-
nection between those lingas and atman. In reply to the objec-
tion, Kal).ada tries to prove that those lingas are connected with 
atman through the medium of the word 'I' as follows: 
CV = Vaise~ika, 0= Opponent) 
V: aham iti sabdavyatirekiin nagamikam (VS 3.2.9) 
"Because of the exclusion [of the other substances like 
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'earth' etc. in regard to the basis of 'exhalation' etc.] 
by the word'!', [it is possible to infer the existence of 
iitman by the lingas such as 'exhalation' etc.]. Therefore 
[the knowledge that iitman exists is] not grounded on 
sacred Scriptures." 
0: yadi ca dr~tapratyak~o 'ham devadatto 'ham yajiiadatta iti 
(VS 3.2.10). 
"If [it is acknowledged that the word 'I'] denotes22) [some-
thing] cognizable because of [expressions] such as 'I am 
Devadatta' or 'I am Yajfiadatta,' 
0: devadatto gacchati vi~'(tumitro gacchatiti copaciiriic charira-
pratyak~a/:t (VS 3.2.11). 
"[we can conclude that the word'!'] denotes a body [which 
is cognizable] because of indirect expressions (upaciira) 23) 
such as 'Devadatta goes' or 'Vi~l).umitra goes'." 
V: sandigdhas tupaciira/:t (VS 3.2.12) 
"But the indirect expression is obscure (sandigdha) (i. e., 
not settled on one conclusion (anaikiintika))24) [because 
it can actually indicate either a body or a soul]." 
V: aham iti pratyagiitmani bhiiviit paratriibhiiviid arthiintara-
pratyak~a/:t (VS 3.2.13) 
"[The word] 'I' denotes another thing (=iitman) [than a 
body] since [the word 'I'] is applied to an individual and 
is not applied to other [people]. [If the word'!' denoted a 
body, we would use it on others, too.]" 
V: na tu sariravise~iid yajiiadattavi~'(tumitrayor jiiiinavise~a/:t 
(VS 3.2.14) 
"[We can] not [know] the difference between Yajfiadatta's 
Linga in the Vaisei~ka and the Mimarilsa 35 
thought and Vi~l).umitra's thought by the difference between 
their bodies. [Therefore the word 'I' denotes another thing 
than a bodY.J" 
Not only some modern scholars25) but also Sridhara26) etc. 
interpret this series of arguments about aham as another proof 
of the existence of iitman apart from such lingas as 'exhalation' 
etc... But this interpretation does not agree with the context 
of the siltra itself, because niigamika in VS 3.2.9 shows that this 
siltra is a response to the objection asserted in 3.2.6-8 and that 
the argument about aham in 3.2.9-14 is a continuation of 3.2.6-8. 
Candrananda also, as the conclusion of this argument, states in 
his commentary on VS 3.2.14 that the word aham is valid as an 
intermediator between iitman and the lingas such as 'exhalation' 
etc .. 27) These facts mean that the opponent in 3.2.6-8 is the 
same as that in 3.2.9-14, that is to say, that the opponent in the 
argument about aham is not a person who denies the existence 
of iitman like a Buddhist, but the opponent who asserts iigamika 
in VS 3.2.8, i. e., a Mimamsaka. 
Therefore we can interpret the argument in VS 3.2.6-14 
as follows: This is an argument between the Vaise~ika school, 
which argues that 'exhalation' etc. are the lingas of iitman by 
presenting the word aham as a intermediator and attempts to 
attest the efficiency of its linga·theory, and the Mimamsa school, 
which, arguing that the word aham denotes a body, criticizes 
the validity of the linga held by the Vaise~ika and asserts that 
one can know the existence of iitman only on the ground of 
sacred Scriptures. 
[7J Through these investigations, we have made clear the 
following points: 
First, in the MS, the word /inga mainly means a Vedic 
passage which is valid to prove a proposition. 
36 
Secondly, though such usage of the word linga can be 
found a few times in the VS, too, there is a difference between 
the Mimamsa and the Vaise!?ika as to the grounds on which a 
Vedic passage becomes a valid means of cognition. For the Mima-
msa, the authority of the Veda comes from its eternity and non-
human-origin: while for the Vaise!?ika, from the buddhi of r~is. 
Thirdly, the VS usually uses the word linga as meaning 
things and phenomena by which ordinary people can infer unseen 
objects. Concerning this kind of linga, we can see the Mima-
msa's criticism and the Vaise!?ika's answer in VS 2.1.15-19 and 
3.2.6-14. 28) 
Lastly, as a general conclusion, it can be pointed out that 
the usage of the word linga in the MS and the VS reflects the 
fundamental standpoints of these two schools and that in the 
stage of the VS the Vaise!?ika school was more closely related 
to the Mimamsa as a critic than it has been regarded until now. 
Notes 
* The present paper is a revised and enlarged English version of my 
article "Vaise~ikasUtra no veda-kan to linga." Indogaku Bukkyogaku 
Kenkyu (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies), 35-2 (1987) pp. 
990-988. 
1) Vi 1924: 29-42, 56-64. Jacobi 1929: 159-160, 162-164. 
2) The first three of the five questions about dharma such as ko 
dharmal;t which Candrananda poses in his Vrtti ad VS 1.1.1 are 
the same as the first three of the five questions about dharma 
in Sabara's Bhii$ya ad MS 1.1.1 (p. 102-3). 
3) The eternity of sabda is discussed in MS 1.1.6-23 and VS 2.2.30-
43: the apauru$eya-tva of the Veda in MS 1.1.27-32 and VS 6.1.1-
2. 
4) Frauwallner (1961: 118) points out that the sUtras which treat 
the sabda-nitya·tva in· the MS do not belong to the oldest layer 
of the MS. In addition to this, Frauwallner (1984) and Wezler 
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(1982: 671-674) insist that VS 1.1.1-3 which explain the dharma 
did not belong to the original VS. 
5) As exceptions, e. g., MS 8.3.3-4, 9.1.45. 
6) linga-darsantic ca: MS 1. 1. 23, 2.2.8, 2.3.9; 15, 3.3.42, 3.4.36; 
45, 3.5.51, 3.6.13; 26, 3.7.5, 3.8.27, 4.1.10; 23, 5.3.18, 5.4.4, 
6.1.18; 52, 6.6.17, 6.7.17; 7.1.19,7.2.10,7.3.15,8.1.4; 8.4.13; 
20, 9.2.22, 9.3.2; 5; 28, 10.1.5; 21; 41, 10.3.49, 10.4.5, 10.5.2; 
51; 74; 87, 10.6.26, 10.8.26, 11.2.33; 46, 11.3.28, 11.4.12, 12.2. 
10, 12.4.4. lingtic ca: 3.2.8, 3.3.3, 5.3.38, 7.3.8, 7.4. 14, 8.2.28. 
7) Renou points out that linga in the ritual literature means 'a 
characteristic element' or 'la "caracteristique" d'un mantra', which 
is usually the name of a deity (1941-42: 153-154 (note 2), Renou 
& Silburn 1954: 71). However, the lingas in Ktitytiyana·srauta-
siUra 1.8.37 and 12.6.30 indicate a passage of the Veda as is the 
case in the MS. Furthermore, the linga in MS 3.3.14 is defined 
as one of the six means supporting the viniyogavidhi. As to this 
linga, see Artha-samgraha (p. 12 & 16ff) , Kane 1962: 1309-11, 
Yoshimizu 1987. 
8) BS 1. 1. 22; 31, 1. 3.15; 35, 1. 4.17; 20, 2.3.13; 15*, 3.2.11; 26, 3.3. 
44*, 3.4.34*; 39*, 4.1.2*, 4.3.4*, 4.4.21*. The linga in the sutras 
marked with an asterisk is used in the same way as in the MS. 
9) VS 5.2.11 : vaidikam ca. C's Vrtti on it: vaidikam vtikyam ... lingam. 
10) VS 6. 1. 2: na ctismadbuddhibhyo lingam r$eIJ. This sutra is rather 
hard to understand. Candrananda identifies the linga in the sutra 
with vijiuina. But from the context, this slltra should be interpreted 
as follows: 'And [the arrangement of the sentence in the Veda] 
does not [arise] from our buddhi. [Therefore this arrangement 
is] a linga [of the existence] of a r$i.' This interpretation is sup-
ported by the anonymous commentary (VS (M) : 58). 
11) VS 1.2.18, 2.1.8; 9; 10; 14; 15; 18-21; 26; 2.2.1; 6; 12; 30; 37, 
3.2.1; 4; 6, 4.1.2, 4.2.9, 5.2.10, 6.1. 2; 3, 7.1.29, 9.20. 
12) See, Nozawa 1983: 142, 145 & note 42, Nozawa 1989: 163-166, 
Nozawa 1991 : 25-27 & note 5. 
13) As to its substantial meaning, see Nozawa 1991: 21. 
14) There is no example of tigama which means the Veda in the MS, 
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where it is usually called sruti etc .. However, iigama is sometimes 
used in the meaning of sacred Scriptures in general induding 
the Veda. Cf. e. g., Manu·smrti 12.105-106, Viikya-padiya 1.30, 
1. 148, 2.489, Tarkajviilii ad Madhyamaka-hrdaya-kiirikti 8.17, San-
kara's Bhii$ya ad BS 2.1. 11 etc. (cf. Nakamura I: 255, Nakamura 
IV: 155-159). Vatsyayana also uses iigama or iigamika in the 
meaning '(based on) verbal testimony' in his Bhii$ya ad NS 2. 1.17 
(NS (C): 440). 
15) Candrananda replaces iigamika with praviida-miitra (a mere rumor). 
On the basis of this interpretation, Wezler states that the oppo-
nent is fictitious because 'it can hardly be assumed that an 
adherent of a rival school ever denied the existence of the 
'substance' wind alone' (1983: 50). But C's replacement is a forced 
one. Cf. note 28 below. 
16) Vi 1926: 520, Nozawa 1991: 29, cf. Nakamura I: 484-485. 
17) I have not yet found such a criticism in the Mimarilsa 
literature. However, the assertion that some objects cannot be 
inferred by laukikarh lingam is found in Viikya-padiya 3. 14. 321 
(=3.1021) (cf. Nakamura IV: 155-157). 
18) Parise$a-inference is adopted in VS 2. 1. 24-26 where sabda is proved 
to be a gU'IJa of iikiisa and in VS 2.2.27-29 where it is proved to 
be gU'lJa. Limitations on the number of objects, however, do not 
come into question there either. 
19) The objection in VS 2. 1. 15-17 can apply to all invisible substances. 
20) Not sarhjfui-karman but sparsa is considered to be the basic 
linga of viiyu, because sparsa works for the inference of both 
an individual wind and wind in general. On the other hand, 
one should understand that samjiiii-karman is a supplementary 
linga for the inference of the latter. 
21) VS 3. 2. 4: prii'IJiipiinanime$onme$ajivanamanogatindriyiintaraviktiriilJ, 
sukhadulJ,khe icchiidve$au prayatnas cety iitmalingiini. 
22) As to the translation of '-pratyak$a' in VS 3.2.10-11 & 13, see 
Nozawa 1988: 466-465, Nozawa 1991: 34-35. But, cf_ Murakami 
1990: 119-121. 
23) An expression such as "Entertain a stick with food (yii$tiktirh 
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bhojaya)" is presented as an example of upaciira in Nyiiya-bhii$ya 
ad NS 2.2.62 (NS (C): 663). Here a Brahmin is signified by 
the word 'stick'. Devadatta and sarira in VS 3.2.11 are considered 
to correspond to the stick and the Brahmin in this example 
respectively. 
24) Cf. VS 3.1. 11-12 and C's Vrtti ad 3.1. 11. 
25) Murakami 1975, Oetke 1988: 338-343; and also Di 1917: 138, 
Faddegon 1918: 247ff, Potter 1977: 95. 
26) PDh (N): 8520ff. 
27) C's Vrtti ad 3. 2. 14: evam ahamsabdena ekiidhikaratzatviit sukhiidaya 
iitmavisayii/:t priitziidayas ca tannimittii/:t. 
28) Such a controversy does not appear in the literature of either 
the Mirnamsa or the Vaise~ika except for the VS as far as I 
research. The main reason may be because, introducing some 
philosophical concepts from the Vaise~ika in later ages, the Mimamsa 
school came to hold a similar view to the Vaise~ika philosophy 
in some matters. For example, Vrttikara's inference-theory is close 
to that of the Vaise~ika (cf. PSV (V): 42al, PSV (K): 123b3, 
Frauwallner 1968: 86, 87, 97-98, Nozawa 1991: 28 & note 5), and 
the concept linga held by Kumarila is also similar to that of 
the Vaise~ika (cf. e. g., Sloka-viirttika, anumiina-pariccheda, kk. 
4, 156). In addition Sabara proves the existence of iitman by 
using the lindas of iitman in VS 3.2.4 (pp. 72-73, Frauwallner 
1968: 50, 51, 111). 
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